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 I.  SOCIALIZATION AND SELF-EVALUATION 
       Kenneth Waltz argues that states are socialized to the international system because they will 
be injured or even destroyed if they fail to adapt to it.1  I believe this claim is correct but should 
be qualified.  Most states are indeed socialized to the international system, but their socialization 
is often slow and sometimes minimal because states widely fail to evaluate their own ideas and 
policies.  Organization theorists note that organizations are poor self-evaluators; I argue here that 
states suffer the same syndrome. 
       This failure to self-evaluate impedes national learning and allows misperceptions to flourish.  
Myths, false propaganda, and anachronistic beliefs persist in the absence of strong evaluative 
institutions to test ideas against logic and evidence, weeding out those that fail.  As a result 
national learning is slow and forgetting is quick.  The external environment is perceived only 
dimly, through a fog of myths and misperceptions. 
       States that misperceive their environment in this way are bound to fail to adapt to it, even 
when the penalties of such failure are high.  Blind to the incentives they face they will respond 
inappropriately, even if they accept in principle the need to adapt. 
       The following two sections frame reasons why self-evaluation is hard for organizations and 
outline ways that parallel problems inhibit evaluation in governments and whole societies.  The 
next two sections detail tactics used by opponents to inhibit or prevent evaluation and frame 
conditions that are more and less conducive to self-evaluation.  The last two sections look at 
cases that shed light on this theory and offer concluding thoughts. 
 
II.  WHY ORGANIZATIONS CANNOT SELF-EVALUATE 
        Aaron Wildavsky contends that organizations poorly evaluate their own policies and beliefs 
because they often turn against their own evaluative units, attacking or destroying them.2  
Evaluation promotes innovation and change.  This threatens the jobs and status of incumbent 
members of the organization.  Hence incumbents often seek to hamper or prevent evaluation and 
to punish evaluators.  These incumbents tend to dominate the organization's decision making, so 
evaluation finds itself with stronger enemies than friends within the organization.  Hence self-
evaluation is often timid and ineffective.3 
       In essence the organization suffers an auto- immune disease of the brain.  It attacks its own 
thinking- learning apparatus if that apparatus does its job.  As a result the organization thinks 
poorly and learns slowly. 
       Private companies hire outside management consultants to get around this problem.  Outside 
consultants know less about company operations than company insiders but are less inhibited 
from telling what they know.  Companies hire them less for their special expertise than because 
they can expose problems that members of the organization, if tasked to evaluate, will pretend 
not to see.  Their ability to speak freely is often the main value that outside consultants provide. 
       The obstruction of evaluation takes several forms.  Targets of evaluation may simply move 
to threaten or destroy the organization's evaluative units.  Threats are often enough to inhibit 
evaluation, making evaluative units into "selective evaluators" that dilute their judgments to 
avoid making enemies.4 
                                                                                                                                                             
     1  Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979): 127-28. 
     2  Aaron Wildavsky, "The Self-Evaluating Organization," Public Administration Review, Vol. 32, No. 5 
(September/October 1972): 509-520. 
     3  Wildavsky notes that "evaluators must become agents of change acting in favor of programs as yet 
unborn and clients that are unknown," so their clients are inherently weaker than their opponents.  "Self-
Evaluating Organization": 510. 
     4  Wildavsky, "Self-Evaluating Organization": 516. 
        Alternately, targets of evaluation can create competing units to produce pseudo-evaluation 
and disinformation that drowns out the voice of eva luation. 5  Or they can refuse to cooperate 
with evaluators.  Specifically, they can withhold or doctor data that evaluators need for their 
evaluation, or they can bargain for leniency in exchange for data.  Or they can threaten 
evaluators with social ostracism or coopt them with personal friendship. 
       Evaluative units also fail if they lack an evaluative ethos.  This happens if members of the 
evaluative unit omit evaluation from their own definition of their professional mission, or if they 
do not recognize the importance of evaluation, or if their emotional loyalties lie with those they 
assess. 
       Often these problems cannot be solved without creating others.  Outside evaluators may 
need help from experienced organization insiders to assess competently.  If these insiders are 
excluded the evaluators may make mistakes of ignorance.  As a result it may be impossible to 
exclude insiders from the evaluation team, despite the danger that they will corrupt the 
evaluation. 
       Finally, evaluative units themselves may be hard to evaluate.  As a result others may not be 
aware when self-evaluation fails so nothing is done to correct the failure, so it persists.  Because 
non-evaluation is underestimated it is more pervasive. 
       In short, organizations non-self-evaluate because obstacles to organizational self-evaluation 
are formidable.  Wildavsky summarized: "I started out thinking it was bad for organizations not 
to evaluate, and I ended up wondering why they ever do it.  Evaluation and organization, it turns 
out, are to some extent contradictory terms."6 
                                                 
     5  Wildavsky, "Self-Evaluating Organization": 514. 
     6  Wildavsky, "Self-Evaluating Organization": 509. 
        Non-self-evaluation is not universal.  Organizations that face a competitive environment, 
such as most private firms, must do some self-evaluation to survive.  This puts a minimum limit 
on how little evaluation the organization can get away with.  Those falling below the minimum 
are destroyed.  But non-evaluation can reach extremes if organizations face little market or other 
environmental discipline--as with most government agencies. 
 
III.  WHY STATES CANNOT SELF-EVALUATE 
       Most political science literature on national misperception relies heavily on psychological 
explanations.7  However, the failure to self-evaluate is a cause of national misperception that 
arises more from institutional dynamics than human psychology.  This highlights the value of 
adding organization theory to the tools we use to understand national misperception. 
       Non-self-evaluation explains national misperception in two ways.  First, government 
bureaucracies non-self-evaluate.  At a minimum, agencies with evaluative responsibilities are 
not invited to evaluate--they are kept out of the loop, their opinions unsought.  At a maximum, 
government agencies actively suppress their own internal evaluative units and are discouraged 
from evaluating the beliefs and policies of other agencies.  As a result official misperceptions 
persist that would fall under scrutiny.  Thus before World War I German navy chief Admiral 
Alfred von Tirpitz censured and silenced German naval officers that dared to reassess his 
                                                 
     7  Prominent examples include Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976); Irving L. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of 
Policy Decisions and Fiascos, 2d ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982); Richard Ned Lebow, Between 
Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); 
Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1985); Yaacov V.I. Vertzberger, The World In Their Minds: Information Processing, 
Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990); 
Ole R. Holsti, Crisis Escalation War (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1972); and Ralph K. 
White, Nobody Wanted War: Misperception in Vietnam and Other Wars, rev. ed. (Garden City, NY: 
 mistaken strategic calculations,8 and French army officers were punished or purged for 
criticizing unwise official offensive doctrines.9  In the United States General Billy Mitchell was 
court-martialled for demonstrating the value of air power at sea, and State Department "China 
Hands" were purged in the 1940's and 1950's for accurately reporting the weakness and 
corruption of China's Chiang Kai Shek government.10  During Vietnam the CIA was deterred by 
the military and White House officials from accurately reporting Vietcong troop strength.  
(Accurate reports would have raised questions about the military's performance and White House 
policy.)11  Meanwhile false evaluators often prosper.  Many U.S. officials responsible for 
corrupting U.S. intelligence--e.g., for the erroneous "bomber gap" estimates of the mid-1950's, 
for miscalculations about Vietnam, and for politicizing CIA intelligence in the 1980s--were later 
reappointed or promoted.12 
                                                                                                                                                             
Anchor, 1970). 
     8  Holger H. Herwig, "The Failure of German Sea Power, 1914-1945: Mahan, Tirpitz, and Raeder 
Reconsidered," International History Review, Vol. 10, No. 1 (February 1988): 68-105 at 74, 85, 104. 
     9  For examples see B.H. Liddell Hart, "French Military Ideas Before the First World War," in Martin 
Gilbert, ed., A Century of Conflict, 1850-1950 (London: Hamilton Hamish, 1966): 136, 142-45; and 
Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1977): 187. 
     10  See Ross Y. Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics (New York: Harper and Row, 1974): 160-
193; E.J. Kahn, Jr., The China Hands: America's Foreign Service Officers and What Befell Them (New 
York: Penguin, 1976); and David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (Greenwich, CT: Fawcett Crest, 
1973): 462-476.  As a result many leading American Asia experts were out of the government or the 
country when their expertise was needed to assess the situation in Vietnam in the early 1960s.  John 
Paton Davies, among the most knowledgeable of these experts, was living in Peru making furniture.  
Ibid.: 462. 
     11  Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA (New York: Pocket 
Books, 1979): 240.  
       The legion examples of the penalizing or firing of "whistle-blowers" in government also illustrate non-
evaluation.  On the suppression of whistle-blowers see Myron Peretz Glazer and Penina Migdal Glazer, 
The Whistleblowers: Exposing Corruption in Government and Industry (New York: Basic Books, 1989).  
Also relevant is the Bureaucracy Task Force, The Whistle Blowers: A Report on Federal Employees Who 
Disclose Acts of Government Waste, Abuse and Corruption (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1978). 
     12  John Prados, The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Soviet Strategic Forces 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986): 49-50; Sam Adams, "Vietnam Cover-Up: Playing War With 
Numbers," Harper's, May 1975: 41-73 at 71 (box, "Moral of the Tale," re: Daniel Graham, Edward Procter, 
and William Hyland); and Melvin A. Goodman, "Ending the CIA's Cold War Legacy," Foreign Policy, No. 
        Government organizations suppress inside evaluation partly to protect bureaucratic 
incumbents and also for other reasons.  Inside dissenters can hamper policy implementation by 
leaking unfavorable information on the policy to outsiders.  This breaks the agency's monopoly 
of information, enabling informed criticism of the policy from observers outside the agency.  
This can empower external opposition that may kill the policy in the cradle.  Fearing such leaks, 
agency leaders will confine policymaking to "team players" that favor the policy from the outset.  
Agency leaders will also hesitate to order internal analyses of the policy, fearing that the analysis 
will be leaked and then taken out of context in public debate.  For example, a technical analysis 
might show curable problems with a policy, but might be used by external policy opponents to 
suggest that the policy is infeasible.  Fearing such a chain of events the agency leader never asks 
for the technical analysis in the first place.  The question "How would that study's results look in 
the New York Times?" often deters needed internal assessments. 
       Confining policymaking to team players and limiting internal analysis prevents leaks that 
could stymie the policy's implementation, but it allows the policy to escape hard questions during 
its formulation.  Thus nonevaluation stems partly from tension between the demands of policy 
formulation and policy implementation.  Sound policy often cannot be made without dissent but 
cannot be implemented with too much of it. 
       Second, the whole society can also suffer the non-self-evaluation syndrome: the national 
process of evaluating public policy is damaged by a scaled-up version of the same dynamics that 
                                                                                                                                                             
106 (Spring 1997): 128-143 at 143. 
       Counterexamples where evaluation was tolerated or rewarded in government can be found.  For 
example, U.S. General George Marshall bluntly criticized his superiors' policies several times during his 
long career but nevertheless won promotion.  Mark A. Stoler, George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman of 
the American Century (Boston: Twayne, 1989): 36-37, 65.  More telltale, however, is that Marshall's peers 
assumed he would be fired after these confrontations.  They were wrong in the specific instance but right 
on the way things usually work. 
 afflict organizations.  Academe, the press, and other non-governmental evaluative institut ions 
often fail to evaluate because evaluation makes enemies that often have the power to defeat or 
deter it.  Government agencies or officials that are targets of evaluation can attack or deter 
evaluators by finding ways to cut their funding.  They can drown out evaluation by setting up 
sham evaluative units to generate disinformation and pseudo-analysis.  They can coopt 
evaluators with special perquisites.  They can domesticate evaluators that need their data by 
releasing this data only to congenial analysts.  They can conceal their strategies and policies, 
leaving evaluators without a clear target to assess.  They can shift rationales and arguments, 
hoping to exhaust evaluators by presenting a moving target.  They can smear the reputations of 
evaluators by releasing defamatory state-collected information.  They can threaten to deny 
evaluators hoped-for state employment.  And in countries where civil liberties are unprotected 
government agencies can of course use police state measures--prison, torture, murder and the 
like--to punish and deter evaluators. 
       Governments are not the only actors that impede or destroy evaluation.  Any strong actor or 
group can do it.  Since the 1960s Cuban-American extremists have silenced American voices 
that questioned their views, often by violence or threat of violence.13  The American tobacco 
industry has used the threat of expensive lawsuits to silence critics who point to the industry's 
many misdeeds.14  And U.S. business firms often punish Wall Street investment houses whose 
                                                 
     13  See for example Cynthia Brown, "Strong-Arming the Hispanic Press: Cuban extremists shape the 
news--with threats and bombs," Contents (July/August 1980): 51-54; Human Rights Watch, "Dangerous 
Dialogue: Attacks on Freedom of Expression in Miami's Cuban Exile Community," Americas Watch/Fund 
for Free Expression, Vol. 4, Issue 7 (August 1992); and Human Rights Watch, "Dangerous Dialogue 
Revisited: Threats to Freedom of Expression Continue in Miami's Cuban Exile Community," 
HRW/Americas and Free Expression Project, Vol. 6, No. 14 (November 1994). 
     14  William Glaberson, "'60 Minutes' Case Illustrates a Trend Born of Corporate Pressure, Some 
Analysts Say," New York Times, November 17, 1995: B14; and James C. McKinley, Jr., "CBS Said to 
Fear Unusual Legal Challenge to '60 Minutes' Tobacco Report," ibid. 
 stock analysts rate their stock poorly by moving their underwriting and bond business elsewhere.  
As a result Wall Street stock analysts glowingly recommend most stocks and almost never name 
companies they would sell.15  Like the children in Garrison Keillor's mythical Minnesota town, 
all stocks are miraculously above average! 
       However, states are the most important anti-evaluators.  States have the greatest power to 
curb evaluation, and the blunders they make in the absence of evaluation have the greatest 
consequences. 
       Thus societies, being very large organizations, suffer the same pathology that damages 
organizational learning.  Non-governmental units that evaluate public policy are usually weaker 
than those they evaluate.  Those they evaluate usually resent and resist evaluation.  Hence policy 
evaluators are often are destroyed, deterred, out-shouted, or coopted.  The whole society opposes 
the national thinking and learning apparatus, just as its bureaucratic components oppose their 
evaluative sub-units.   
       Moreover, the defects in evaluation of national beliefs and policies are often underestimated 
by those not close to it.  As a result too little is done to compensate for poor evaluation, or to 
improve it.  Academics have a monopoly on academic expertise.  As a result outsiders often 
cannot tell how little evaluation academe actually produces so they fail to criticize academe for 
its failure to evaluate.  Professors are therefore free to immerse themselves in irrelevant research 
on obscure topics--a common academic pastime, especially in the social sciences--without being 
criticized for their irrelevance.  They can be as irresponsible as they wish, a freedom that many 
                                                 
     15  Michael Siconolfi, "Incredible 'Buys': Many Companies Press Analysts to Steer Clear of Negative 
Ratings," Wall Street Journal, July 19, 1995: 1; Diana B. Henriques, "The Pleasure of 'I Told You So'," 
New York Times, August 8, 1998: E1; and Gretchen Morgenson, "Flying Blind in a Fog of Data," New 
York Times, June 18, 2000: 3-1. 
 fully exploit. 
       In short, impediments to self-evaluation operate on a national as well as organizational scale.  
Public policy analysis seldom reaches the standards achieved in the professions and natural 
sciences because policy evaluation is crushed, deterred, or coopted.  As a result policy debate 
often assumes an inane character.  Key hypotheses and assumptions are unspecified and 
untested, and facts are assumed without proof.  Charlatans who purvey disinformation on behalf 
of special interests often have the loudest voice and the last word.  Thus Ernst Cassirer once 
noted the "deep chasm" between the customs of scientific and political inquiry:16 
When it comes to political action man seems to follow rules quite different from those 
recognized in all his mere theoretical activities.  No one would think of solving a 
problem of natural science or a technical problem by the methods that are recommended 
and put into action in the solution of political questions.  In the first case we never aim 
to use anything but rational methods. ... But in man's practical and social life the defeat 
of rational thought seems to be complete and irrevocable. 
In politics, Cassirer notes, "modern man is supposed to forget everything he has learned in the 
development of his intellectual life.  He is admonished to go back to the first rudimentary stages 
of human culture."  In political dialogue "rational and scientific thought openly confess their 
breakdown."17 
       Evaluation is weak because social knowledge affects the distribution of social and political 
power.  Hence the creation of social knowledge is politicized.  Elites suppress evaluation because 
it often threatens their social or political positions.  Society needs evaluation to formulate 
                                                 
     16  Ernst Cassirer, The Myth of the State (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1955): 1-2. 
     17  Myth of the State: 2. 
 effective state policies but smothers it to protect the social and political order from challenge.  
Thus in 1939 the American sociologist Robert Lynd wrote:18 
A world foundering disastrously because of its inability to make its institutions work is 
asking the social sciences: "What do you know?  What do you propose?"  And, 
unfortunately for the peace of mind of the social scientist, these questions are not asked 
with complete dispassion; not infrequently they are loaded in the sense of, "Tell us what 
we want to hear, or else--!" ... The social scientist finds himself caught, therefore, 
between the rival demands for straight, incisive, and, if need be, radically divergent 
thinking, and the growingly insistent demand that his thinking shall not be subversive. 
... [The university professor] lives in a world which, by and large, is not asking, "Is 
Smith trying to get at the facts?  Is he trying to be fair and constructive at the same time 
that he is unwilling to pull his punch?" but which asks, "Are you for us, or against us?" 
       Likewise Hans Morgenthau noted that societies destroy those who question the myths that 
support the power and authority of dominant groups:19 
In all societies certain social problems cannot be investigated at all, or only at grave risk 
to the investigator.  The basic philosophic assumptions by which society lives are 
beyond scient ific investigation, for to question them is tantamount to questioning the 
worth of society itself, its justice, its rationality, its very right to exist. ... [Evaluative 
social science becomes] a political threat to the defenders or the opponents of the status 
quo or to both; for the social conventions about power, which political science cannot 
                                                 
     18  Robert S. Lynd, Knowledge For What? The Place of Social Science in American Culture (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1939): 7, 10. 
     19  Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Purpose of Political Science," in James C. Charlesworth, ed., A Design 
for Political Science: Scope, Objectives, and Methods (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, 1966): 63-79 at 69, 72. 
 help subjecting to a critical--and often destructive--examination, are one of the main 
sources from which the claims to power, and hence power itself, derive. 
       Evaluation often serves no interest except the general interest.  Hence even oppositions and 
out-groups will not evaluate: instead they, like their opponents, issue self-serving propaganda.  
As a result the "free marketplace of ideas" often creates a confusion-sowing competition among 
charlatans that generates more darkness than light.  Thus Marxist critics of capitalist foreign 
policies crafted their criticism less to explain reality than to strengthen the case for socialist rule.  
For example, in their studies of imperialism V.I. Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg endorsed the false 
economic notions of nineteenth-century American and European imperialists because this helped 
them argue that capitalism fostered imperialism, hence was warlike, and so was inferior to 
socialism. 20  Their writings were less "evaluation" than self-serving propaganda, crafted to 
advance socialist claims to power.  Finding truth was a secondary concern. 21 
       In sum, states misperceive partly because national evaluative machinery is weak or 
defective, evaluation meets powerful resistance, and it often profits no one capable of doing it.  
As a result state decisions are often taken without serious analysis, on the basis of simplistic 
analogies or misinformation.  Careful assessment of key ideas is never done. 
       Non-evaluation is a permissive condition that allows militaristic and nationalistic myths to 
survive.  If evaluation is effective such ideas are challenged and filtered out.  More often 
                                                 
     20  Luxemburg's ideas closely track the nonsense economic arguments advanced by U.S. imperialists 
during 1899-1900 for annexing the Philippines.  Summarizing Luxemburg is Benjamin J. Cohen, The 
Question of Imperialism: The Political Economy of Dominance and Dependence (New York: Basic Books, 
1973): 34-49 especially 43-44.  Summarizing the economic ideas of U.S. imperialists is David Healy, U.S. 
Expansionism: The Imperialist Urge in the 1890s (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970): 42-46, 
159-177. 
     21  Another criticism of the "free marketplace of ideas" is Benjamin Ginsberg, The Captive Public: How 
Mass Opinion Promotes State Power (New York: Basic Books, 1986).  Ginsberg argues, similarly to the 
main argument of this chapter, that the ideas "free market" in fact resembles a monopoly because 
 evaluation is weak; this allows such myths to persist once they gain a footing.  Non-evaluation 
also is a prerequisite for diversionary war--that is, wars begun by elites to stir public support for 
the regime.22  This ploy succeeds only because the public is unaware that the war is a political 
ruse.  Better evaluation would unmask the ruse, making it ineffective.  Other kinds of war-
causing misperception--false optimism, conflict spirals, deterrence failure stemming from acts of 
appeasement that grow from underestimates of others' hostility, and so forth--are also reduced by 
strong policy evaluation and thus are fostered by non-evaluation.  If misperception is a major 
cause of war, so also is non-evaluation. 
       A political science literature has developed on the topic of government learning--that is, of 
when and how states improve their understanding of the world.23  The tone of this writing is 
unduly optimistic about the possibility of government learning because it omits the problem of 
non-evaluation.  Non-evaluation is a powerful retardant to government learning and a powerful 
cause of government forgetting.  It makes states inherently prone to overlook what they once 
knew; to accept and to act on false and even silly premises; and hence to make policy blunders.  
It would be good if governments could create and conserve knowledge.  But evaluation is a 
prime engine of learning--perhaps a prerequisite for learning--and governments are reflexively 
hostile to evaluation.  Hence government learning is almost an oxymoron.  Governments can 
learn, but only poorly and unreliably, and they often forget at an even faster rate. 
 
IV.  TACTICS USED AGAINST EVALUATION 
                                                                                                                                                             
intellectual resources are heavily skewed, leaving some groups as producers and others as captive 
consumers of ideas. 
     22  On diversionary war see Jack S. Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique," in Manus I. 
Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989): 259-288. 
     23  Reviewing this writing is Jack S. Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual 
        What specific mechanics are used to inhibit evaluation?   
       Evaluation is often suppressed by direct attack on evaluators.  Thus before World War I 
dissident German scholars were disciplined or fired from universities,24 and critics of official 
policies were hounded from the German navy. 25  French officers who criticized the French 
army's doomed offensive war plan saw their writing suppressed and their careers destroyed.26  In 
Germany after the war the historian Hermann Kantorowicz was attacked by his colleagues for 
debunking the myth that Britain had organized an aggressive encirclement of Germany before 
1914, and his work was suppressed.27  Later the historian Fritz Fischer saw his government 
funding cut and was denounced for "national masochism" in the press after publishing studies 
that exposed German responsibility for the First World War.28 
       In Japan before World War II government ana lysts who warned against confrontation with 
the United States were fired and arrested.29  Academics who questioned Japan's expansionism 
were dismissed, and publishers were forbidden to publish authors who failed to tow the official 
                                                                                                                                                             
Minefield," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994): 279-312. 
     24  Gordon A. Craig, Germany 1866-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978): 203-204.  Even 
the nationalist historian Hans Delbrück was almost fired in 1899 for voicing a difference with the Kaiser's 
policies.  Ibid.: 203. 
     25  Herwig, "Failure of German Sea Power": 85. 
     26  Liddell Hart, "French Military Ideas Before the First World War": 144-45; Jan Karl Tanenbaum, 
"French Estimates of Germany's Operational War Plans," in Ernest R. May, ed., Knowing One's Enemies: 
Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986): 150-
171 at 164; and Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism: Civilian and Military, rev. ed. (New York: Free Press, 
1959): 222, 352. 
     27  Holger H. Herwig, "Clio Deceived: Patriotic Self-Censorship in Germany After the Great War," 
International Security, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Fall 1987): 5-44 at 34-36; Imanuel Geiss, "The Outbreak of the First 
World War and German War Aims," in Walter Lacqueur and George L. Mosse, eds., 1914: The Coming of 
the First World War (New York: Harper & Row, 1966): 71-87 at 73; and Jerzy Marczewski, "German 
Historiography and the Problem of Germany's Responsibility for World War I," Polish Western Affairs, Vol. 
12, No. 2 (1971): 289-309 at 301. 
     28  James Joll, "The 1914 Debate Continues: Fritz Fischer and His Critics," in H.W. Koch, ed., The 
Origins of the First World War: Great Power Rivalry and German Aims (London: Macmillan, 1972): 13-29 
at 15-16; and Imanuel Geiss, "Origins of the First World War," in Imanuel Geiss, ed., July 1914: The 
Outbreak of the First World War: Selected Documents (New York: W.W. Norton, 1967): 9-53 at 12. 
     29  Michael A. Barnhardt, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941 
 line.30 
       During the 1950s American scholars who displeased the Taiwan government were attacked 
by the China lobby and its U.S. allies.  The Lobby forced the Institute of Pacific Relations to 
close.31  Prominent China specialists were smeared with false charges of pro-communist 
sympathy and investigated by Congress.32  Ross Koen believes that the Lobby achieved "the 
virtual destruction of the public and governmental reputations and influence of many of the 
foremost private China specialists in the United States."33   
       French journalists were intimidated, arrested and fined, beaten, or expelled from Algeria if 
they covered the seamier side of French operations in the Algerian war of independence (1954-
62).34  The French press bent to this pressure, omitting coverage of many ugly stories.35 
       The Indian government purged and replaced Indian military officers who correctly warned 
in 1961 that China would resist India's incursions in the Himalayas.36  And after these incursions 
provoked China to rout India's forces, the Indian government raided the offices of the publisher 
of Neville Maxwell's India's China War, which had exposed the governments' pre-war 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987): 170-71, 199-200, 268. 
     30  Thomas R. Havens, Valley of Darkness: The Japanese People and World War II (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1978): 23. 
     31  Koen, China Lobby: xiv, 133-159. 
     32  Koen, China Lobby: 117-131. 
     33  China Lobby: 131.  Michael Schaller notes that "an entire generation of government China experts 
was professionally destroyed.  The purge of these diplomats ... ensured that a long time would elapse 
before the next generation of China specialists emerged.  Until then the blind would lead the blind."  
Michael Schaller, The United States and China in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1979): 130.  
     Remarkably, Ross Koen's own book was also attacked and suppressed, an event that nicely illustrated 
its argument.  His book was first printed in 1960 but the China Lobby, with assistance from allies inside 
the U.S. government, enjoined its distribution and it was not republished until 1974.  See Richard C. 
Kagan, "Introduction," in Koen, China Lobby: ix-x; and Stanley D. Bachrack, The Committee of One 
Million: "China Lobby" Politics, 1953-1971 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976): 167-172. 
     34  Phillip Knightley, The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist, and Myth 
Maker (New York: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, 1975): 358-369. 
     35  Knightley, First Casualty: 358-59. 
     36  Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore: Johns 
 blundering. 37  A folly caused by attacking evaluators can often be concealed by punishing or 
deterring later evaluators. 
       In the U.S. many television journalists lost their jobs during the blacklisting of the McCarthy 
period.  And Congress has investigated the major television networks for airing documentaries 
that offended powerful special interests.38 
       Needless to say, evaluators in communist dictatorships have fared far worse.  Josef Stalin, 
Mao Zedong, Pol Pot and Kim Il-sung routinely jailed, tortured, and murdered critics who 
questioned their policies until all were terrified into silence. 
       Evaluators that are not attacked may be ignored.  Ibn Khaldãn, the  great Arab historian of 
antiquity (1332-1406), was until recently largely forgotten in the Arab world and was only 
rediscovered by Arabs via Western scholars.  Like all great historians Khaldãn had sinned by 
criticizing his own people.  After his rediscovery his works were banned in Iraq for their 
supposed criticism of Arabs.39  The writings of Karl von Clausewitz have been widely ignored 
by modern militaries, who find his arguments for defensive tactics and civilian control 
uncongenial; the less insightful but more agreeable writings of Antoine Jomini are much more 
widely read at military academies.40  Historians who deviated from official post-1918 German 
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 innocence propaganda, such as Bernadotte Schmitt, were unread in Germany after World War 
I.41  During late 1950 top U.S. policymakers never gave a proper hearing to government analysts 
who warned that U.S. policies would soon provoke a Chinese attack on U.S. forces in Korea.42  
And during the 1960s the works of renowned Vietnam expert Bernard Fall were unknown to 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara for many years; although Fall taught in Washington the 
Defense Department preferred to import a more congenial expert from England.43 
       Alternately, evaluators may find their message suppressed.  Lord Lansdowne, Conservative 
Party leader in the British House of Lords, had difficulty finding a British newspaper willing to 
publish his peace proposal in 1916.44  The 1971 film The Sorrow and the Pity, which exploded 
the treasured French myth of a strong French resistance by showing that many French acquiesced 
to Germany's World War II occupation, was banned from French television. 45 
       Japan's Colonel Iwakuro Hideo returned from a 1941 fact- finding mission to the United 
States to report that the U.S. had vast industrial superiority over Japan.  Japan's chief of staff 
Sugiyama Gen burned the report, explaining that its conclusions were at variance with the 
supreme will of the state.46 
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        SaburÇ Ienaga found that the Japanese education ministry refused to approve his high 
school history text in 1963 because it was "excessively critical of Japan's position and actions in 
World War II."  Ienaga had sinned by truthfully noting "atrocities by Japanese troops," speaking 
of the "reckless war," and accurately arguing that "the war was glorified as a 'holy cause'."  The 
ministry claimed this did "not give students a proper understanding of this country's positions 
and actions in the war."47 
       Evaluation is sometimes defeated by starving it of information.  During World War I the 
British war cabinet was kept in the dark by military leaders; this often made civilian control over 
war policies impossible.  Thus before the disastrous British offensive at Passchendaele in 1917 
the Cabinet tried to assess General Douglas Haig's proposed campaign but Haig concealed vital 
facts, including realities of German strength and the fact that the French and Haig's own 
Intelligence Staff had advised against his plan. 48  Likewise, in Japan cabinet ministers were 
denied access to data on Japanese military strength during the 1941 government debate over war 
with America, so discussion proceeded in a factual vacuum. 49  And once at war the military 
services kept the Japanese government ignorant of military developments: Prime Minister TÇjÇ 
was not even told of the navy's defeat at Midway until a month later.50 
       Post-hoc evaluation is frustrated by concealing archives.  For decades the German 
government hid archives showing that Bismarck had helped to instigate the 1870 Franco-
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 Prussian war,51 and the U.S. state department has often withheld documents showing the U.S. in 
a bad light from its declassified documents series.52   
       Targets of evaluation also starve it of information by concealing their aims and strategies; 
this leaves evaluators with no target to assess.  Thus in August 1914 the German government 
issued a formal ban on any publication discussing German war aims or peace terms in other than 
vague and general terms.53  Those concerned about German policy had no policy to judge. 
       Opponents of evaluation can disrupt it by proliferating competing pseudo-evaluations.  
Governments and private interests operate internal propaganda organs and fund friendly external 
think tanks that publish congenial policy analysis.  These institutions clog the debate with 
disinformation and sow confusion.  Often their analysis ignores contrary analysis instead of 
answering it, so the public debate becomes a contest of volume.  As studies pile up outsiders find 
it harder to intrude because the amount of "literature" to master before one qualifies as an expert 
becomes unmanageable.  Thus Herbert Gans notes how news sources can manipulate the news 
by "news saturation"--"the proliferation of so much information by the source that some of it 
cannot help but turn into news, concurrently placing less well organized sources with more 
accurate information at a disadvantage."54 
       For example, after 1918 the German government funded hundreds of corrupt studies 
claiming German innocence for World War I tha t drowned more serious analyses of the war's 
origins.55  And in the United States since the 1980s the fossil fuel industries have organized a 
noisy public relations campaign to obscure the near-consensus among scientists that significant 
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 human-caused global warming is underway.  As a result the U.S. public exaggerates scientific 
disagreement about the basic facts of the matter.56 
       Finally, evaluators can be coopted or domesticated, their evaluation tempered or suppressed 
with their consent.  Thus the famed journalist Walter Lippmann observed that journalists' pursuit 
of the truth can clash with their "desire to be on good terms with the powerful," who are 
"dispensers of many kinds of favor, privilege, honor and self-esteem."57  Joel Primack and Frank 
von Hippel likewise argue that scientific criticism of U.S. government policies has sometimes 
been silenced by including scientists on advisory boards whose reports remain confidential.  
Participating scientists gain access to official secrets and the corridors of power, but lose their 
right to comment in public.  If the government heeds their advice then evaluation has succeeded, 
but if their views are ignored evaluation has been silenced. 
 
V.  CONDITIONS CONDUCIVE TO SELF-EVALUATION 
       What conditions most conduce to policy evaluation, and which are least conducive? 
       Prospects for evaluation heavily depend on having a large system of free universities.  These 
universities must be autonomous from the state and be well protected by traditions of academic 
freedom.  They must be so numerous that orthodoxies cannot easily gain hegemony in particular 
disciplines, but instead will always face challenge from dissenting views.  Evaluation will be 
weak where these conditions are missing--where universities have little autonomy and are few in 
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 number.  Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan and the Soviet Union score badly 
on these dimensions; modern Britain scores better, and the modern United States--with its huge 
system of highly independent schools--scores very well. 
       A large system of free universities is not enough by itself, however.  Academics must also 
have an evaluative ethos--a sense that their duties include evaluating important official or 
popular beliefs.  This ethos is often missing: instead many scholars hold policy-relevant studies 
in disregard while dwelling on esoterica.  In its absence a large university system can become a 
self-contained community in which academics serve as markets for one anothers' writings and 
ideas.  If this market is large enough academics can forego the need to address the wider society; 
their internal market sustains them.  Large academic community size then operates to inhibit 
evaluation by giving scholars a guaranteed audience that tolerates irrelevance and obscurantism.  
Scholars that seek to avoid addressing reality can retreat by addressing this audience.58 
       Evaluation is better when publics and elites are socialized to value evaluation.  Oppositely, a 
hyper-patriotic public climate can deter evaluation by conditioning potential audiences to 
condemn evaluators as unpatriotic.  Critics of official mistakes become, in the public mind, 
opponents of flag and country; this deters such critics to begin with. 
       The effectiveness of evaluation varies with issue area.  Evaluation is best when the expertise 
required to evaluate the policy or belief is grounded on a well-developed science.  It is worst if 
this expertise is grounded on poorly-developed science.  Thus in the United States evaluation has 
been most effective when policies have turned on hard-science issues--for example, the danger 
that smoking causes cancer, or that chlorofluorocarbons released into the atmosphere will 
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 destroy the ozone layer.59  The basic methods of the hard sciences have proven effective and 
withstood scrutiny.  As a result evaluation grounded in hard science is often done well, and its 
results are hard to ignore because they rest on proven methods.  Evaluation grounded on social 
science stands on a weaker foundation: social science remains a primitive enterprise, lacking 
proven methods and cumulative traditions.  As a result evaluation grounded in social science is 
often done poorly, and even when done well it lacks the prestige to persuade others to accept its 
conclusions. 
       Evaluation is weaker in issue areas where policymakers have a monopoly of information and 
expertise.  For example, evaluation of national defense and security policy is impeded in all 
societies by barriers of secrecy and classification.  Secrecy shields information from hostile 
powers, but also inhibits evaluation by analysts inside and outside of government by starving 
them of data.  Domestic policies that turn on widely-available information and expertise are 
evaluated more effectively. 
       Evaluation is better when evaluation threatens politically weak interests and protects strong 
interests.  Unfortunately this is rarely the case, especially when important policies are evaluated.  
Important policies tend to affect important interests; these interests can mobilize large resources 
to defeat evaluation.  As a result more important policies are often less well-evaluated.  Thus 
Holger Herwig suggests a perverse law whereby "those events that are most important are 
hardest to understand because they attract the greatest attention from mythmakers and 
charlatans."60 
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        Evaluation is better when evaluators are skilled in political action.  Policy evaluation 
requires academic/scientific ability, but its success depends as well on expertise in political 
combat and public relations.  Evaluative institutions will be subjected to political attack and they 
must have effective strategies for coping.  They must infuse their personnel with an ethos that 
anticipates and accepts the hardship that these attacks create.  They should recognize that the 
results of evaluation must be publicized effectively; unpublicized studies have no results.  This 
requires a grasp of public relations techniques and willingness to use them.  Evaluative 
institutions perform poorly unless their leaders recognize and address the combat nature and the 
public nature of the enterprise.  (This recognition is often missing among academics, weakening 
their efficacy as evaluators.) 
 
VI.  EVIDENCE FROM CASES 
       How common is policy non-self-evaluation?  Where does it most thrive, and what conditions 
produce it?  How much national misperception can it explain?  Light is shed on these questions 
by policymaking in Germany, France, Italy, Britain, and the United States in the last century, 
especially during the two world wars.  Wartime is a good venue for study because the stakes of 
wartime decisions are very high, so evaluation failure cannot be ascribed to the inattention that 
leaders often give to secondary issues.  If we find evaluation failure, therefore, we can infer that 
a pathology such as nonevaluation--not mere inattention--was at work. 
       What do we find?  Policymaking by the belligerent powers in the two world wars was quite 
poor despite the gravity of the issues and the high cost of error.  The belligerents made large 
errors without carefully assessing their options.  Even rudimentary analysis often would have 
exposed these errors but was omitted.  Governments often later failed to reassess their wartime 
 decisions in search of lessons.  Individuals who did evaluate were often attacked and punished 
for their trouble.  And some who might have evaluated--especially academics--sometimes drifted 
into dreamy irrelevance, studying questions of no importance while central issues were 
unaddressed.  Things were worst in the more authoritarian states (Germany, Japan, and Italy) and 
best in the United States, but even there things were not satisfactory. 
       The German foreign policy debate before World War I saw frivolous arguments pass 
unchallenged to become the basis for policy, while German scholars further poisoned the debate 
instead of steering it toward solid ground.61  The German press was filled with articles that 
glorified war and offered fatuous but unanswered arguments for empire.  The public was assured 
that war was a fine experience--the "noblest and most sacred manifestation of human activity"62--
and told that "we Teutons" must "no longer look upon war as our destroyer ... at last we must see 
it once more as the savior, the physician."63  Expansionists wrongly warned that without colonies 
Germany would "suffocate in her small territory."64  If Germany did not expand, one magazine 
ludicrously warned, "we shall be so dwarfed that we shall become a second Belgium."65  
Expansionists also exaggerated the value of empire by falsely claiming that conquests could 
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 serve as markets, fields for investment, and areas for resettlement of German "surplus 
population."  And they purveyed a myth of British geopolitical momentum to highlight the need 
for a big navy: Germans were warned that Britain and Russia were achieving immense growth, 
thereby destroying the "balance in the world," which must be checked by a German battle fleet.66  
Germany was portrayed as in relative economic decline67--even though Germany actually had 
Europe's fastest-growing economy.68 
       German scholars were largely silent in response to this nonsense, offering little in the way of 
answer or assessment.  Their silence reflected the fact that scholars who disputed official dogmas 
risked their careers.  As Charles McClelland notes, any scholar "who ran against the current of 
accepted orthodoxy ... had great difficulties making a good career in Imperial Germany."69 
       In-government policy assessment in Germany was likewise suppressed.  Admiral Tirpitz 
censured critics of his ideas within the Navy and restricted the right of the admiralty staff to 
discuss strategic planning. 70  German diplomats abroad likewise knew that their careers would 
suffer if they disputed views that were fashionable in Berlin.71  
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        German policy evaluation in wartime was no better, as Germany's crucial 1917 decision to 
escalate its U-boat campaign illustrates.  This decision probably cost Germany the war but 
German leaders barely looked before they leaped.  The German Navy knew that unlimited U-
boat warfare would bring the U.S. into the war but argued that this would not matter.  Admiral 
Tirpitz' successor, Eduard von Capelle, preposterously declared that the military significance of 
American intervention would be "zero, zero, zero!"72  Even in early 1918 Tirpitz announced that 
"America's help is a phantom."73  In fact U.S. entry on the Allied side probably decided the war 
for the Allies; without it Germany could well have won. 
       The German Navy's rosy hopes for the unlimited U-boat campaign were based on the 
assumption that Britain would surrender after five months of U-boat blockade.  This claim rested 
in turn on a host of flimsy notions, including: the assumption that Britain would not respond by 
convoying its merchant fleet (an obvious countermeasure); would fail to requisition neutral 
shipping; and would be discouraged into surrender although its American ally would shortly 
come powerfully to its assistance.74  Advocates of escalation also overlooked possible British 
food stockpiles, which neutral sources estimated enough for one year.  They forgot that Britain 
could begin importing goods that took less shipping space--flour instead of grain, canned meat 
instead of livestock.  They overlooked that Britain had secured the English Channel from 
submarines, and thus was no longer really an island--it could import goods by rail through 
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 French, Spanish, Portuguese or Italian ports.75  They assumed that Britain's decision to surrender 
would be independent of America's joining the war on her side.76  Later German historian 
Gerhard Ritter found it "utterly baffling" that trained naval officers could produce such 
incompetent analysis.77 
       German leaders accepted these judgments.  After the war, the German Secretary of State 
confessed that the possibility that the war could last two more years despite the U-boat blockade 
"was not being considered seriously by anyone at that time [of the U-boat decision]."78  
Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg had believed that American entry into the war would mean 
nothing more than America's "delivering food to England, providing some financial help, and 
sending some aeroplanes and a corps of volunteers."79  He never scrutinized the Navy's dubious 
claims.80   
       Even after the war German naval officers denied that the U-boat campaign was mistaken.  In 
1919 Admiral Koch argued that the U-boat campaign had failed because doves at home had 
stabbed it in the back; Britain might have sued for peace had it not been for the peace resolution 
of the German socialists and British awareness of Austrian peace sentiments.81  German officials 
could speak such nonsense because German policy ideas faced no meaningful evaluation, even 
post hoc, from inside or outside of government. 
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        German academics were cheerleaders for Germany's follies throughout the war.  Instead of 
evaluating official arguments they echoed and amplified them.  In October 1914 ninety-three of 
Germany's leading scholars published a manifesto untruthfully proclaiming German innocence 
for starting the war, for violating Belgian neutrality, and for committing atrocities in Belgium.  In 
1915 three hundred and fifty-two professors signed another petition demanding vast annexations 
and endorsing unlimited submarine warfare.82  The renowned sociologist Max Weber sang the 
war's praises.83  Only a handful of academics raised their voices against German policies, and 
they were punished for it.  One, Prof. Georg Nicolai, finally fled to Denmark fearing for his life.  
Another, Prof. Georg Mehlis, was drafted and killed in action soon after he published an article 
against the war.84 
       In allied countries neither war aims nor military tactics were analyzed carefully.  Clear war 
aims were never specified.85  Critics of French and British offensive tactics were purged from the 
army,86 and scapegoats were blamed for successive failures.  The reputations of the generals 
survived successive failures.  In France General Joffre kept his command even after France's 
horrendous defeat in the August 1914 Battle of the Frontiers.  The British government put blame 
for Britain's 1915 defeat at Neuve Chapelle not on its generals--where it belonged--but on British 
munitions workers, who allegedly spent their days drinking in pubs instead of making shells for 
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 General French's forces.87   
       Those responsible for failure were seldom called to account.  A.J.P. Taylor notes that during 
the war "none of the statesmen who had blundered into war was discredited by his blunders.  
Asquith, Viviani, Bethmann, remained national leaders. ... The generals who had failed to fulfil 
their confident promises of victory were discredited even less. ... Those British generals who 
prolonged the slaughter kept their posts and won promotion; any who protested ran the risk of 
dismissal."88   
       Nor did the British Army assess its conduct of World War I in retrospect.  As Brian Bond 
notes, there was "no inclination [in the British army] to profit from the dreadful experience by 
studying [its] lessons," and "virtually no official attempt was made to garner the experience of 
the First World War while it was still fresh," something Bond finds "astonishing."  Only in 1932 
was a War Office committee set up to study the lessons of the war.89  Meanwhile General Haig, 
who led the ruinous British failures at the Somme and Passchendaele, was made an earl and 
received 100,000 pounds from parliament.90 
       The French also made little effort to learn from their errors after the war.  Most striking was 
their disinterest in assessing the flaws of Plan 17, the French war plan of 1914.  That plan was 
premised on the strange assumption that Germany would lack sufficient troops to move beyond 
the Meuse river on its advance through Belgium.  After the war no French officer or historian 
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 even tried to explain this grave intelligence blunder91--doubtless from fear of retribution by the 
still-powerful blunderers. 
       The myth of the offensive survived the war.  In the 1920s many generals still preached the 
power of the offense, and denied that the defense had actually had the advantage during the war.  
In his memoirs Germany's General Ludendorff wrongly claimed: "Of the two [policies], the 
offensive makes less demands on the men and gives no higher losses."92  In Britain the army's 
faith in offensive doctrines during the war was not seriously assessed until 1927, when Winston 
Churchill published data in his World Crisis showing that attackers had taken significantly 
greater losses than defenders during the war.  These facts, noted Churchill, "do not appear to 
have been at all appreciated in even the most expert circles" even nine years after the war, and 
"no true impression has ever reached the public."93  In other words the slaughter at 
Passchendaele and the Somme went unanalyzed for years after the battles happened.94  The lives 
these battles consumed were wasted twice--by the battle and then by the failure to learn from it. 
       General Alfred von Schlieffen's disastrous 1914 German war plan was celebrated as a 
brilliant showpiece for decades after World War I, especially in Germany.  A generation of 
Schlieffen's disciples and admirers, and most historians, thought it a clever scheme ruined in 
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 execution by others who lacked the courage to carry it through as Schlieffen had conceived it.95  
Schlieffen himself was written up as the supreme German strategist.96  The Schlieffen myth was 
not scrutinized until Gerhard Ritter finally published The Schlieffen Plan in 1956, forty-two 
years after the fact.97 
       Admiral Tirpitz's failed strategic ideas remained popular with interwar German naval 
leaders98 and won new fans in the German air force.  The Luftwaffe was so taken with Tirpitz's 
"risk" theory--which held that a large German fleet could intimidate Britain into neutrality, a 
notion clearly disproven by events during 1898-1914--that it argued for creating a long-range 
bomber force as an analogue to Tirpitz's "risk" fleet.  Luftwaffe chief Herman Goering even 
termed the proposed bomber force a "risk fleet."99 
       Weimar German scholars made no effort to assess the policies that had led Germany to war 
and defeat.100  Instead they parroted the patriotic line--denying German responsibility for the war 
and repeating the "stab in the back" myth that blamed Germany's defeat on leftists at home.  
Conservative German publishers conspired to reinforce these messages, commissioning hundred 
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 of books that echoed these and other belligerent themes.101 
       The Weimar government hampered evaluation of past German policies by massively 
concealing or doctoring documents and other records that implicated Germany in 1914 or 
otherwise made Germany look bad.102  It also deployed pseudo-evaluation in the form of 
scholars who appeared to be independent but were in fact paid employees of the German foreign 
ministry, hired to iterate official arguments.103 
       Britain's appeasement policy in the late 1930s was not informed by an assessment of 
German intentions or the effect of appeasement on allied continental strategy.  No top British 
leaders read Mein Kampf.104  The British press paid scarcely any heed to Nazi ideology, making 
little effort to explain it to British readers.105  Chamberlain took no brief to Munich that surveyed 
the Czechoslovak question; nor did he ask if a truncated Czechoslovakia could remain 
independent, or what the strategic effect would be fo r the West if Czechoslovakia were lost, or 
how the national composition of Czechoslovakia could be ascertained.106  A.L. Rowse concludes 
of British leaders:107 
That they did not know what they were dealing with is the most charitable explanation 
of their failure; but they might at least have taken the trouble to inform themselves. ... 
To be so uninstructed ... was itself a kind of dereliction of duty. 
       The Axis powers scarcely evaluated the policies that brought them to ruin in World War II.  
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 Hitler never requested an evaluation of how German forces could fight the United States before 
his disastrous decision to declare war on the U.S. in 1941.108  By Hitler's own absurd estimate 
Germany's Luftwaffe and U-boat forces were strong enough to keep any American troops from 
landing in Europe.109  Hitler also offered nonsense economics to justify his expansionism--"Our 
economic situation is such that we cannot hold out more than a few years. ... We have no other 
choice, we must act."110 
       After Hitler's rise German academics showed little resolve to assess the ideas that shaped 
Nazi policies.  The Nazi regime savagely suppressed criticism, but suppression was barely 
necessary where German scholars were concerned since they had scant impulse to evaluate.  As 
Oscar Hammen notes, German historians "needed little 'coordination'" under the Nazis--they 
were quite willing to silence themselves or even to endorse the regime's ideas.111   
       In Japan fatuous analogies instead of analysis governed policy.  Foreign Minister Matsuoka 
YÇsuke thought Japan's expansion was "as natural as the growth of a child.  Only one thing 
stops a child from growing:--death."112  General SatÇ KÇjirÇ explained that Japan was like a 
tree, and "a tree must have its roots."  Britain had roots in Africa, India, Australia and Canada; 
the U.S. had roots in North, Central and South America.  Now Japan must have roots in Asia to 
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 escape its "potted plant" existence, or it would shrivel and die.113  That such ideas were vastly 
wrong was shown by Japan's fabulous post-1945 economic success with no such "roots." 
       Before Pearl Harbor Japan's government never seriously studied Japan's chances of winning 
a war against the United States.114  It made no overall estimate of Japan's power and had no 
master plan for the conduct of the war.115  It failed to analyze the likely effect of attacking Pearl 
Harbor on American will to defeat Japan. 116  The Japanese Navy never seriously discussed the 
implications of its proposed advance into Southeast Asia--which triggered the war with the 
United States--with top government officials.117  The Japanese army made no real effort to assess 
the military strength of the United States,118 and suppressed whatever assessment was done. 
       Robert Butow notes that TÇjÇ and his colleagues often made decisions without fully 
exploring their consequences and that "conclusions seem to have been based more on intuition 
than on reason."119  SaburÇ Ienaga notes the decision for war betrayed "casual assumptions," 
"shoddy analysis," and "extreme lack of objectivity in planning."120 
       This poor thinking developed in a Japanese government that never had to answer critics.  
Instead it suppressed criticism of its expansionist policies to a point where anti-war criticism 
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 disappeared from public dialogue.121  Evaluation became so dangerous that it almost never 
happened.  Fatuous policies--and national ruin--were the result. 
       In Italy Mussolini's imperial program was barely analyzed and Italian foreign policy ideas 
bore little relation to reality.  The Italian government made little effort to assess Italian military 
capabilities, or the capabilities of Italy's adversaries, or the value of empire to Italy. 
       Many of Mussolini's arguments for expansion had been falsified by events even before they 
were made.  Fascist leaders claimed that a wider empire would enrich Italy--even though Italy's 
existing colonies needed large subsidies.122  They claimed that millions of Italians could be 
resettled in the proposed East African colonies--Mussolini talked of sending ten million 
emigrants to the empire--even as Italian settlers in East Africa fell year by year, from 146,000 
workers in 1936, to 23,000 in 1939, to just 854 agricultural families in May 1940.123   
       These errors reflected a total failure to study the situation.  The Fascist government never 
assessed the feasibility of sending settlers to Africa,124 and it planned the annexation of Albania 
in 1938 without making any survey of the colony's potential profitability.  Denis Mack Smith 
notes that Mussolini's imperial ideas were "effective as propaganda" but "would not have borne 
close and serious investigation."125  They survived because they faced no such investigation. 
       Italian estimates of national military strength were equally deluded.  Italian authorities 
thought the Italian Air Force was second to none, and that Italy was impregnable.  Mussolini 
claimed the Italian air force was leading the world, and spoke of blacking out the sun with the 
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 sheer numbers of his aircraft.126  Fascist propagandists claimed Italy's air force was stronger than 
the RAF and that one Italian air squadron could destroy any British fleet in the Mediterranean. 127  
In 1939 official Italian figures showed Italian air strength at 8,530 planes; in fact Italy had only 
583 bombers and fighters, nearly all of which were inferior to British planes.128 
       Fascist writers claimed that Italy had one of the strongest armies in Europe, and a navy and 
air force that had reached perfection.  They boasted that Italy had "little or nothing to learn" from 
Germany or anyone else in military matters.129  In fact at the end of World War II Italy still 
lacked a real tank, and it produced more aircraft in World War I than World War II.130  Italy's 
peak artillery production rate in World War II was less than one-sixth its peak rate in World War 
I.131  In the 1930s Fascist propagandists claimed Italy could mobilize a 12 million man army: in 
fact it mobilized only three million men, who carried rifles designed in 1891.132  As Denis Mack 
Smith concludes, in Fascist Italy "myth-making became the one essential art of government, 
more important than statesmanship or farsightedness or even effective administration."133 
       In short, the history of policymaking in the European and Asian belligerent states of the two 
world wars is a record of recurrent folly.  The belligerents repeatedly made blunders that could 
have been exposed by minimal objective analytic scrutiny, had it been allowed.  These blunders 
were common among the democracies, even more common among the authoritarian states.  Thus 
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 the realist image of these wars--that they grew from collisions among rational-acting states 
whose misperceptions reflected the opaqueness of the international environment--is incorrect.  
The belligerents misperceived a rather transparent world because they had no functioning 
analytic apparatus.  This occurred because the belligerent governments and societies punished 
evaluation, often quite savagely.  
       If so, these cases indicate that non-evaluation is pervasive.  Even the large incentive for 
rational calculation posed by the perils of total war may be unable to overcome it. 
       Conditions for evaluation have been better in the United States than elsewhere, and the 
quality of policy evaluation in the U.S. has accordingly been higher than in the belligerent states 
discussed above.  But measured against an absolute standard it leaves much to be desired.  The 
quality of analysis achieved by the professions or the hard sciences is seldom achieved in 
evaluation of major public policies, especially foreign and security policies. 
       Striking instances are found where important U.S. policies were never evaluated.  For 
example, in the 1930s U.S. officials simply assumed the strategic importance of China and 
Southeast Asia to the United States; no study of their importance was done.  On this flimsy basis 
the U.S. pursued a collision course with Japan. 134  Amazingly, before intervening in Vietnam in 
1965 U.S. officials made no systematic assessment of Vietnam's importance to the United 
States.135  The Reagan Administration did no careful analysis before announcing its 1983 
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 Strategic Defense Initiative (or SDI, also known as "Star Wars").136 
       Instances of the suppression or deterrence of evaluation in the U.S. are also abundant.  
During World War I a sizable number of U.S. college teachers were fired for expressing anti-war 
views; the American Association of University Professors even announced in 1918 that it did not 
endorse guarantees of freedom of expression on campus "in a time so critical."137  As noted 
above, many U.S. government China analysts lost their jobs in the 1940s and 1950s for honestly 
reporting the corruption of China's Chiang Kai Shek government.  Pentagon leaders once fired a 
budget analyst for informing Congress about defense cost overruns, and another time engineered 
the firing of a former top official from his private sector job after he criticized current defense 
budget priorities.138  Undersecretary of Defense Donald Hicks bluntly threatened in 1986 to deny 
Defense Department funding "even for basic research" to outside institutions that housed 
scholars who criticized Defense Department programs--a chilling threat to the many U.S. 
universities that receive Defense Department research funding. 139  Such stories could be 
multiplied many times. 
       Finally, evaluative lassitude is pronounced among American scholars, as observers of 
academe have often remarked.  Thus Hans Morgenthau once lamented that American political 
science is guilty of a general retreat from evaluation.  Instead, he noted, it hides in "the trivial, 
the formal, the methodological, the purely theoretical, the remotely historical-- in short, the 
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 politically irrelevant."140  External hostility would be a badge of achievement for social science--
"a political science that is mistreated and persecuted is likely to have earned that enmity because 
it has put its moral commitment to the truth above social convenience and ambition."141  Instead 
political science ducks criticism by producing obscure and irrelevant research.  "History and 
methodology, in particular, become the protective armor which shields political science from 
contact with ... political reality."  Morgenthau observed a "new scholasticism," in academe--the 
pursuit of an "intellectual exercise, frequently executed with a high degree of acumen and 
sophistication, that tells us nothing we need to know about the real world."  Scholars maintain 
their reputations by "engaging in activities that can have no relevance for the political problems 
of the day"; instead they substitute a "fanatical devotion to esoteric terminology and 
mathematical formulas, equations, and charts, in order to elucidate or obscure the obvious."  As a 
result, in the study of international affairs "prudence and truth are bent to the purposes of power, 
and ... superstition takes the place of rational knowledge."  Social science resembles "a deaf man 
answering questions which no one has asked him."142   
       Many others have echoed Morgenthau's criticisms.  Russell Jacoby laments the retreat 
toward irrelevance of American social science, despite the infusion of people with background in 
social criticism into universities.143  Jacoby observes that even the New Left intellectuals, now 
ensconced in the academic world they once opposed, produce writing that is "largely technical, 
unreadable, and--except by specialists--unread."144  For them professionalized social science has 
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 "served as a refuge" from social assessment.145  Robert McCaughey notes that specialists on 
international affairs were conspicuously absent during the 1960s Indochina War debate, to which 
their expertise was highly relevant.146  David Ricci complains that during 1959-69 only one of 
the 924 articles that appeared in the three leading political science journals dealt with Vietnam, 
and only six percent dealt with policy analysis in the broadest terms.147  Patricia Wilner reports 
that during 1936-82 only 5.1 percent of articles in the official sociology journal, American 
Sociological Review, addressed critical political and social events such as the cold war, 
McCarthyism, and protest movements.148  Todd Gitlin criticizes his fellow sociologists for 
expressing themselves in "inward-turning, indecipherable prose" that revealed that they "cannot 
be bothered to clarify matters for the reader who is not among the adept."149  David Newsom, a 
foreign policy practitioner, complains that academics who publish on international relations 
"disappear behind a curtain of jargon" and "speak to each other rather than to a wider public."  
As a result "much of today's scholarship is either irrelevant or inaccessible to policymakers."150  
An appalled Martin Anderson notes the "trivial substance of much academic research and its 
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 blissful irrelevance to the vital problems of the world."151  Commenting on scholars of East Asia, 
Richard Samuels laments "the reluctance of many political scientists with Japanese language 
expertise to engage in prescriptive research."152 
       This academic lassitude stems partly from fear of punishment for evaluating but more from a 
lack of evaluative ethos.  Far more than non-academics are aware, vast areas of American social 
science are infused with a contempt for policy assessment.153  In many university departments 
those whose research veers into areas of policy importance are viewed as second-rate intellects, 
and those who write for the public are dismissed as mere popularizers.154  The department 
majority assumes that these lesser minds address the real world because they lack the brilliance 
needed to ascend to more lofty theoretical heights.  Academic evaluators accordingly find that 
their work often brings them little respect or reward from colleagues.  We can only wonder how 
the American people would react if they understood the contempt with which their problems and 
concerns are treated by university faculties who are expensively supported by their tax and 
tuition dollars. 
       Nevertheless, evaluation in the United States is better than elsewhere.  This is seen in the 
confined nature of most large American foreign policy blunders.  Big mistakes have been 
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 common, but at some point most were recognized and reversed.  Thus the U.S. erred by being 
disengaged from Europe before World Wars I and II, but it reversed the error by joining those 
wars and by later organizing NATO and deploying troops to Europe during the Cold War.  The 
U.S. erred by attempting to conquer North Korea during the Korean war but it abandoned this 
goal after China intervened in the war.  The U.S. blundered into Vietnam but eventually cut its 
losses and accepted failure.  This record contrasts sharply with the relentless pursuit of error by 
Germany, Japan and Italy earlier in this century.  Once set on a course of folly these powers 
usually stayed firmly on it.  They learned little or nothing from their successive failures.  Only 
total defeat could set the state on a new course. 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
       Inquiry about politics is harder inquiry in the natural sciences because the investigator must 
overcome both the question and an established order that often fears the answer.  As a result, 
state policies are often adopted on the basis of less careful analysis than their importance 
warrants, leaving wide room for mistakes and misperceptions.  Forces of knowledge destruction 
are often stronger than those favoring knowledge creation.  Hence states have an inherent 
tendency toward primitive thought, and the conduct of public affairs is often polluted by myth, 
misinformation, and flimsy analysis. 
       A major risk of war lies in the tendency of policymakers to underestimate this phenomenon 
and assume instead that states are intelligent actors.  Policymakers are safer to assume that both 
their own state and their adversaries are prone to folly and to buffer their policies against this 
fact.  They should rarely adopt policies that demand a large measure of sophistication and 
subtlety because such policies will often exceed their own state's analytic capacity.  Adversaries 
 should be assumed to be slow to learn, blunder-prone, and hard to deter.  Ill-considered actions 
by adversaries should be anticipated.  Nonevaluation injects folly into the warp and woof of 
international politics; policymakers should accept this reality and plan accordingly. 
       Nonevaluation has been noticed before but explained in psychological terms.  For example, 
Irving Janis has argued that the psychology of small-group dynamics, which he labels 
"groupthink," causes decision-makers to abandon their independence of mind and conform to the 
dominant view in the group.  As a result the dominant view is never carefully examined even if it 
is woefully flawed.155  Martha Wolfenstein, addressing another piece of the problem, argues that 
people who warn of disaster face hostility, even if they are proven right, because those who 
suffer the disaster interpret it as personal punishment and interpret warnings as threats of 
punishment.156  Hence we see the "kill the messenger" syndrome--those who bring useful bad 
news are punished for it. 
       Nonevaluation theory differently argues that groupthink dynamics reflect the simple 
tendency of people, for rational self-serving reasons, to make life hard on those who criticize 
their performance.  Evaluators understand this tendency and are deterred by it--they silence 
themselves from fear of retribution.  And nonevalua tion theory explains the kill the messenger 
syndrome as occurring because warnings of disaster threaten the reputation of leaders or officials 
who allowed the danger to arise, and may threaten other government incumbents by raising the 
need to address the disaster by innovation, with its attendant possibility of personnel shakeups.  
In this view the working out of self- interest in the context of bureaucratic power-politics, not 
                                                 
     155  Irving L. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes 2nd ed., 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982): 2-13. 
     156  Quoted in Lebow, Between Peace and War: 153-54. 
 psychological dynamics, explain the nonevaluation phenomenon. 157 
       Several prescriptions emerge from the list of conditions conducive to evaluation outlined 
above.  One solution lies in infusing academic professions with a stronger evaluative ethos.  At a 
minimum active hostility toward policy studies should be abandoned.  More positively, academic 
professions could formally recognize and reward evaluative work in hiring, tenuring, salary, and 
prize-giving decisions.  A second solution lies in developing non-academic institutions that 
assume the mission of encouraging, protecting, and rewarding evaluative work.  During the past 
two decades such a movement has taken hold on a small scale, embodied in the growth in 
Washington of institutions dedicated offering legal and financial protection for "whistle blowers" 
in government.158  The concept behind these organizations could applied more broadly, and 
institutions could be developed to serve as counterweights against the pressures that will 
otherwise operate to still evaluation. 
                                                 
     157  Three-cornered tests that compared the power of these explanations would be useful.  On three-
cornered tests see Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," 
in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1970): 91-196 at 115. 
     158  These organizations include the Whistleblower Assistance Fund, the Government Accountability 
Project, and the Project on Military Procurement. 
